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Summary
The United States faces a number of significant national security threats, ranging
in scope from intercontinental ballistic missiles to the use of weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) by terrorists.  The debate over the seriousness of the various
threats intensified recently, even before the events of September 11, 2001.  Various
studies and commissions recommended far reaching changes in the U.S. approach to
domestic preparedness and response to threats to the homeland, many now being
implemented.  Many experts believe the probable long term effects of a WMD attack
by terrorists on the population, environment, and the economy make it imperative
that the U.S. be fully prepared to either deter or interdict an attempted terrorist attack.
This paper reviews the current legislation and policies that govern the military’s
role when supporting law enforcement in a domestic terrorism crisis and highlights
some of the issues confronting the U.S. government. To fully understand the
military’s role in domestic crisis response it is necessary to explore existing national-
level structures and response options prior to the involvement of military forces.
Crisis management is predominately a law enforcement function that manages the
resources necessary to prevent or resolve a terrorist incident, including one involving
WMD.  Current U.S. government terrorism response policy is contained in
presidential directives.  Among other matters, these directives address National
Security Council structure and federal agency crisis response roles when responding
to a domestic terrorism incident.  The creation of the Department of Homeland
Security and U.S. Northern Command has not yet changed the basic roles and
relationships described herein.
Many federal agencies are available to assist the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI) in dealing with a terrorist threat or in the resolution of an actual terrorist
incident. The Department of Defense (DoD), as a supporting agency in domestic law
enforcement operations, has developed and maintains plans and capabilities to
respond to threats or acts of terrorism, including those involving the use of nuclear,
biological, or chemical weapons.  In a domestic crisis, DoD may be called upon to
assist in several different ways ranging from actual interdiction of the terrorists to the
loaning of specialized equipment for use by law enforcement agencies.  DoD has
published specific policy for assistance to civil law enforcement officials in
emergencies involving terrorism and WMD.  U.S. terrorism policy is an issue of
growing policy debate.  Most experts believe that a comprehensive national strategy
for domestic terrorism is a critical step in defeating the threat.  Some say more
effectively employing DoD’s capabilities during domestic crisis response operations,
or new relationships based on the recent creation of the Department of Homeland
Security are the best methods to ensure success against domestic terrorism.  Lastly,
newly proposed congressional oversight roles are seen by many as an important
factor in a more effective response to domestic terrorism.  This report will be updated
should major changes occur to the relationships described.
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1 This report was first published by Jeffrey D. Brake on April 19, 2001 under the supervision
of Edward F. Bruner, Specialist in National Defense, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade
Division, CRS.  It has been updated by Edward F. Bruner.
2 Weapon of Mass Destruction is defined in the United States Government Interagency
Domestic Terrorism Concept of Operations Plan as any device, material, or substance used
in a manner, in a quantity or type, or under circumstances evidencing an intent to cause
death or serious injury to persons or significant damage to property.”  It is generally
accepted that any amount of chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) material
constitutes WMD. 
3 See, for example, Report from the National Commission on Terrorism, Countering the
Changing Threat of International Terrorism available on the Internet at
[http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/commission.html] and The United States Commission on
National Security/21st Century, Road Map for National Security: Imperative for Change,
Washington, DC, January 31,2001. 
Terrorism and the Military’s Role in
Domestic Crisis Management: Background
and Issues for Congress1
Introduction
The United States faces a wide range of national security threats, from
intercontinental ballistic missiles to the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD)2
by terrorists.  The debate over the seriousness of the various threats has intensified
recently.  Various studies and commissions have recommended far reaching changes
in the approach to domestic preparedness and response to threats to the homeland.
The threat of domestic terrorism has generated a wide ranging debate regarding all
organizational aspects of the problem, including the approach from a strategic
perspective and the more focused aspects of organizational structure, budgetary
priorities, and intelligence collection. Several recent studies have proposed a greater
role for the U.S. military in combating terrorism while others call for the creation of
entirely new structures to combat the complete spectrum of threats to the United
States, including terrorism and the use of WMD by terrorists.3
This paper outlines current legislation and policies that govern the military’s
role when supporting law enforcement in a domestic terrorism crisis.  It also
highlights some of the issues confronting the U.S. government.  The military forces
designed to respond to a crisis differ significantly from units designed to support the
post-crisis consequence management of a terrorist incident.  As such, they are
governed by different directives and levels of authorization for their employment.
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4 Colum Lynch, “Bin Laden Sought Uraniuan, Jury Told,” Washington Post, February 8,
2001, p. A2.
5 See for example: Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism
Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction (Gillmore Commission), I. Assessing the Threat
and II. Toward a National Strategy for Combating Terrorism; GAO Report GGD-99-107,
Combating Terrorism: Observations on Federal Spending to Combat Terrorism; and CSIS
Homeland Defense Working Group Report Defending the U.S. Homeland: Strategic and
Legal Issues for DoD and the Armed Services.
6 The FBI defines terrorism as including “the unlawful use of force or violence against
persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any
segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives.”  DoD defines terrorism as
“The calculated use of violence or threat of violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce;
or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political,
religious, or ideological.”  The State Department, by statute, defines terrorism as
“premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by
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Until recently, terrorism to many Americans was a remote, if frightening
possibility that affected only individuals or groups outside the territorial boundaries
of the United States.  Events of the past decade indicate that the terrorist threat has
changed significantly in ways that make it more dangerous and much more difficult
to counter.  The terrorist attacks of the 1970s and 1980s usually had clear political
objectives. These attacks resulted in just enough bloodshed and loss of life to gain
attention to the terrorists’ cause yet not enough to alienate them from the public
support they sought.  Bombings, kidnapings, and aircraft hijacking were
accomplished by declared, identifiable groups with specific political goals in mind.
In contrast, the decade of the 1990s has produced a different type of terrorism -
terrorism designed to produce massive casualties with little regard for distinct
political goals and often no claims of responsibility.  Recent examples of this type of
attack, such as the World Trade Center bombing in New York City, the Alfred P.
Murrah Federal Building bombing in Oklahoma City, the East African Embassy
bombings in 1998, and destruction of the World Trade Center in 2001 make it appear
that a terrorist’s aim is to kill as many people as possible.  The possible inclusion of
weapons of mass destruction in the terrorists’ arsenal now makes this an even more
dangerous proposition.
Recently, in the trial of the perpetrators of the East African Embassy bombings,
a witness testified that Usama bin Laden’s group, al Qaeda (Arabic for “the Base”),
sought to acquire chemical and nuclear material to use against the United States.4
Although it is unknown whether al Qaeda was successful in acquiring the material,
the probability that terrorist groups who have openly threatened the United States are
attempting to acquire a WMD capability is a serious escalation of this dangerous
problem.
The Forecast Trend
Many recent government and private sector reports and studies conclude that the
United States is becoming increasingly vulnerable to terrorism.5  Although terrorism
is defined in different ways by various U.S. government agencies,6 it is generally
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subnational groups or clandestine agents.”  
7 The United States Commission on National Security/21st Century.  Road  Map for
National Security: Imperative for Change, Washington, DC, January 31, 2001, p. viii.  This
group, also known as the Hart/Rudman Commission, looked broadly at all future national





















Figure 1: Terrorism Becoming More Lethal
accepted that terrorism is a crime designed to coerce others into actions they would
not otherwise take or into refraining from actions that they desire to take.  Today’s
terrorists, like their predecessors, seek to instill fear, undermine government
authority, and possibly goad the government into overreacting to the incident or
threat.  What has changed in the past decade is the willingness of the terrorist to
inflict indiscriminate casualties as evidenced by the data in Figure 1.  In the preceding
decade, the United States emerged as the only superpower, and as such, the most
lucrative target for terrorists.
Source:  Countering the Changing Threat of International Terrorism.  Report from the National
Commission on Terrorism, p. 5.
Although many analysts agree that terrorists are most likely to use conventional
explosives, their use of a WMD in the U.S. is now seen as a possibility. For example,
the United States Commission on National Security/21st Century states:
The combination of unconventional weapons proliferation with the persistence
of international terrorism will end the relative invulnerability of the U.S.
homeland to catastrophic attack.  A direct attack against American citizens on
American soil is likely over the next quarter century.7 
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8 Two attacks on the Tokyo subway system by Aum Shinrikyo,  one in June 1994 and
another in March 1995, produced 19 deaths and approximately 5500 injuries.  The March
1995 attack resulted in the greater amount of casualties, many of which were psychosomatic.
For a more detailed account of Aum’s development and failed attacks see David
Rapoport,”Terrorism and Weapons of the Apocalypse,” National Security Studies Quarterly,
Summer 1995, pp. 56-58. 
9 Alan Feuer, “Jihad Inc. Finds a Business in Terrorism,” New York Times, February 13,
2001, p. C17.
10 Vernon Loeb, “Jet Purchase, Bin Laden Linked,” Washington Post, February 15, 2001,
p. A20.
11 Central Intelligence Agency and National Intelligence Council, Global Trends 2015, pp.
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The release of a chemical agent into the Tokyo subway system by the Aum
Shinrikyo terrorist group in 1995 demonstrated the devastating possibilities of a
WMD attack as well as the difficulties of using a WMD to produce mass casualties.
The group spent millions of dollars using highly skilled technicians with an overall
result that probably produced far fewer casualties than conventional explosives.8
However, the global cultural and political impact of the attack was massive.
Although terrorists have long intended to harm the public, now they may posses
much greater capabilities to do so.  A former member of al Qaeda described the
terrorist group’s world-wide corporate structure of multiple businesses and bank
accounts from Africa to Europe and Asia.9   By purchasing an excess U.S. military
business jet and flying it to Sudan where it was to be used for transporting the
terrorist organization’s weapons, al Qaeda vividly portrayed its ability to effect
undercover transactions.10
The Central Intelligence Agency and the National Intelligence Council forecast
the following trends that may affect the future security of the United States:
Asymmetric threats in which state and non-state adversaries avoid direct
engagements with the US military but devise strategies, tactics, and weapons -
some improved by “sidewise” technology -  to minimize US strengths and exploit
perceived weaknesses.
Internal conflicts stemming from religious, ethnic, economic or political disputes
will remain at current numbers or even increase in number.
Prospects will grow that more sophisticated weaponry, including  weapons of
mass destruction - indigenously produced or externally acquired - will get into
the hands of state and non-state belligerents, some hostile to the United States.
The likelihood will increase over this period that WMD will be used either
against the United States or its forces, facilities, and interests overseas.
Chemical and biological threats to the United States will become more
widespread; such capabilities are easier to develop, hide, and deploy than nuclear
weapons.  Some terrorists or insurgents will attempt to use such weapons against




8-9 & 38.  Available at [http://www:odci.gov/cia/publications/globaltrends2015/].
12 Although PDD-39, U.S. Policy on Counterterrorism, is a classified document, a redacted
copy with the unclassified portions is online at [http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd39.html].
13 Defined in The United States Government Interagency Domestic Terrorism Concept of
Operations Plan as “The agency designated by the President to lead and coordinate the
overall federal response. . .determined by the type of emergency.”  The Lead Federal
Agency will “provide an initial assessment of the situation; develop an action plan; monitor
and update operational priorities; and ensure each agency exercises its concurrent and
distinct authorities under US law. . .”
14 Presidential Decision Directive 39, U.S. Policy on Counterterrorism, The White House,
Washington, DC, June 21, 1995.
The consequences of failing to deter, detect, or preempt terrorist attacks, some
possibly with WMD, would be devastating.  In addition to the tragedy of hundreds
or thousands of dead and injured citizens, the long lasting serious economic and
psychological damage to American society could well prove to be the terrorists’
greatest victory.
Current U.S. Government Policy
The implications of a successful WMD attack against the United States goes
beyond the potential loss of life, mass casualties, and infrastructure damage of a
single incident.  Many experts say the probable long term affects of such an attack
on the population, environment, and the economy make it imperative that the U.S.
be fully prepared to either deter or interdict an attempted attack by force if necessary.
Should an incident take place, the U.S. government must be prepared to manage the
consequences of the attack.  These two responses - crisis and consequence
management - are the cornerstones of current U.S. policy towards combating
terrorism.
Presidential Decision Directive 39 (PDD 39), signed in June 1995, is the
foundation for current U.S. policy for combating terrorism.12  The document spells
out three objectives for confronting terrorism: 1) reduce the nation’s international and
domestic vulnerabilities to terrorism; 2) deter terrorism; and 3) respond to terrorism
rapidly and decisively.  PDD 39 designates Lead Federal Agencies13 for international
and domestic terrorism policy.  The Lead Federal Agency for combating terrorism
overseas is the Department of State (DOS) and the agency designated to respond to
terrorist attacks on U.S. soil is the Department of Justice (DoJ) through the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI).  The Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA) has primary responsibility to lead federal efforts to deal with the
consequences and collateral second and third order effects of terrorist WMD attacks
on American soil.14
PDD 39 pays particular attention to WMD and includes language stating “The
United States shall give the highest priority to developing effective capabilities to




17 National Security Presidential Directive-1, Organization of the National Security Council,
The White House, Washington, DC, February 14, 2001.
18 Federal Bureau of Investigation, United States Government Interagency Domestic
Terrorism Concept of Operations Plan, Washington, DC, December 8, 2000, p. 7.
19 The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is designated the Lead Federal
Agency for Consequence Management of domestic terrorist incidents.
chemical (NBC) materials or weapons use by terrorists.”15  It goes on to state that the
highest priority in combating terrorism is to prevent the acquisition or use of a WMD
capability by terrorist groups opposed to the U.S.16  PDD 62, Protection Against
Unconventional Threats to the Homeland and Americans Overseas, reinforced PDD
39 and further clarified agency roles in combating terrorism.  In both PDDs, the
Department of Defense (DoD) plays a supporting role to the Lead Federal Agencies.
President George W. Bush recently signed National Security Presidential
Directive-1 (NSPD-1) establishing the organization of the National Security Council
under his Administration.  Among other things, the document abolishes the previous
system of interagency working groups and replaces them with policy coordination
committees (PCC).17  The functions of the PCC dealing with terrorism and WMD are
discussed below.
Crisis Management of Domestic Terrorism Events 
To understand fully the military’s role in domestic crisis response it is necessary
to explore the national-level structures and response options prior to the involvement
of military forces.  In general, the laws of the United States assign primary authority
to the federal government to prevent and respond to terrorism. The FBI, through DoJ,
is designated the Lead Federal Agency for crisis management of threats or acts of
terrorism that take place in the United States or in international waters that do not
involve the flag vessel of a foreign country.  Crisis management is  predominately a
law enforcement function that manages the resources necessary to prevent or resolve
a terrorist incident including intelligence gathering, surveillance, tactical operations,
negotiations, forensics, and follow-on investigations.  It also includes technical
missions involving WMD such as search, render safe procedures, transfer and
disposal of a device, and limited decontamination if necessary.18  The federal
response to a terrorist incident is seen as a highly coordinated interagency operation
that can include federal, State, and local participation.  Primary federal agencies
besides the DoJ and the FBI are the Federal Emergency Management Agency,19 DoD,
the Department of Energy, the Environmental Protection Agency, the Department of
Health and Human Services, and now the Department of Homeland Security.
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National Level Crisis Management Structure
Past experience has shown that non-federal local authorities are normally the
first to respond to most emergencies or threats.  Once it is determined that federal
authorities should enter the coordination and decision process, those same authorities
will ultimately decide if or when the federal government will begin coordination of
the entire process.  Some of the factors that determine how fast and to what extent
federal intervention takes place are the nature of the incident, the intended target, the
potential consequences of a successful incident, and the capabilities of the local
authorities.  The United States Government Interagency Domestic Terrorism Concept
of Operations Plan (CONPLAN) states that the “laws of the United States assign
primary authority to the federal government to prevent and respond to acts of
terrorism or potential acts of terrorism.”20   The federal response will surely come
sooner than later if the possibility exists that a WMD is involved in the incident.
Additionally, if WMD is involved, the FBI may look to DoD for assistance in earlier
stages of the crisis.
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National Preparedness, National Security Council, Washington, DC, February 28, 2001.
The National Security Council.  The National Security Council (NSC) is
the center of U.S. government efforts to coordinate the national response to threats
or acts of domestic terrorism.  The NSC Principals Committee, the Deputies
Committee, and the Counterterrorism and National Preparedness Policy Coordination
Committee (PCC) constitute the major policy and decision making bodies involved
in the federal response to terrorism (see Figure 2).
The PCC has four standing subordinate groups to coordinate policy in specific
areas.  The Counterterrorism and Security Group (CSG) coordinates policy for
preventing and responding to foreign terrorism, either internationally or domestically.
The Preparedness and Weapons of Mass Destruction Group provides policy
coordination for preventing WMD attacks in the United States and developing
response and consequence management capabilities to deal with domestic WMD
incidents.  The Information Infrastructure Protection and Assurance Group handles
policy for preventing and responding to major threats to America’s cyberspace, and
the Continuity of Federal Operations Group is charged with policy coordination for
assuring the continued operation of Constitutional offices and federal departments
and agencies.21
When the NSC is advised of the threat of a terrorist incident or actual event, the
appropriate  subordinate group will convene to formulate recommendations for the
Counterterrorism and Preparedness PCC who in turn will provide policy analysis for
the Deputies Committee.  The Deputies Committee will ensure that the issues being
brought before the Principals Committee and NSC are properly analyzed and
prepared for a decision by the President.
The FBI Crisis Management Structure
The FBI’s first step when a terrorist threat is discovered is to initiate a threat
credibility assessment.   The FBI takes immediate steps to identify, acquire, and plan
for the use of federal resources to augment the State and local authorities if the threat
is deemed highly credible or an incident is verified.  The FBI will designate a Federal
On-Scene Commander (OSC) who functions as the incident manager for the U.S.
Government.  Initially, incident response resources are acquired from the United
States Attorney’s Office in the affected area.  The OSC considers the following
priorities when developing the strategy to respond to the threat:
1) Preserving life or minimizing risk to health;
2) Preventing a threatened act being carried out or an
existing act from being expanded;
3) Locating, accessing, rendering safe, recovering, and disposing 
of a WMD;
4) Rescuing, decontaminating, transporting, treating victims,
CRS-9
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Figure 3: FBI Joint Operations Center
and preventing secondary casualties;
5) Releasing emergency public information;
6) Restoring essential services and mitigating suffering;
7) Apprehending perpetrators
8) Conducting site restoration.22
The FBI Operational Response.  The FBI manages the crisis from a local
command center known as the Joint Operations Center (JOC) (see Figure 3).  The
JOCs primary purpose is to coordinate the law enforcement activities of the various
federal, State, and local agencies responding to the emergency.  The local FBI Special
Agent In Charge (SAC) will establish the JOC with the express purpose of
countering the threat or actual incident based on a graduated and flexible response.
The JOC is designed to quickly accommodate the participation of other agencies
responding to the terrorist threat or incident.  FBI Headquarters in Washington D.C.
activates its Strategic Information Operations Center (SIOC) to aid in coordinating
national-level support to the terrorism incident site when notified that a field office
has activated a JOC.   The SIOC coordinates the federal response and draws upon the
appropriate tactical, technical, scientific, and medical resources available from
national-level organizations.23  This is especially important when a credible nuclear,
biological, or chemical terrorist threat is received.  DoD, among other federal
agencies, will provide liaison officers to the SIOC during a threatened or actual
WMD incident.
The Critical Incident Response Group. Normally, the FBI will respond
initially to the incident with tactical assets from the local field office.  Field office
assets include Special Weapons and Tactics Teams trained in planning and executing
CRS-10
24 U.S. General Accounting Office, Combating Terrorism: Federal Agencies’ Efforts to
Implement National Policy and Strategy, Report Number GAO/NSIAD-97-254, September
1997, pp. 40-41.
25 CIRG Home Page, Tactical Support Branch. Available on the Internet at
[http://www.fbi.gov/programs/cirg/tact.htm].
26 GAO Report, Combating Terrorism, September 1997, p. 43.
27 CONPLAN, p. 28.
Source: U.S. General Accounting Office, Combating Terrorism: Federal Agencies’ Efforts
to Implement National Policy and Strategy, Report Number GAO/NSIAD-97-254,
September 1997, p. 44
high-risk tactical operations when called upon.  When the threat or actual incident
exceeds the capability of the on-scene forces, the FBI’s Critical Incident Response
Group (CIRG) can deploy the necessary resources to augment the local team.  The
CIRG was established in 1994 to give the FBI the ability to respond with the tactical
and investigative expertise needed in a major terrorist incident. The CIRG can
augment with crisis managers, hostage negotiators, behavioral scientists,
psychologist, surveillance assets, and agents.24
The tactical centerpiece of the CIRG is the Hostage Rescue Team (HRT).  The
team is headquartered in Quantico, Virginia, with 91 FBI Special Agents authorized
and its mission is to serve as a full time national-level tactical team able to deploy to
any location within four hours of notification.  The HRT is also specially trained and
exercised to ensure it can operate in a chemical or biological environment.  The team
is structured to deploy in segments, or as an entire unit depending on the severity of
the crisis and it can be augmented with other law enforcement critical entities from
the CIRG.25
The Domestic Emergency Support Team.  A critical element of effective
national- level coordination is the notification and deployment of the Domestic
Emergency Support Team (DEST).  The DEST is a rapidly deployable, interagency
team of experts to advise and support the FBI crisis management effort.  The DEST
can include representation from the DOE, HHS, EPA, FEMA, and DoD.  It is the
responsibility of DoD to provide transportation for the DEST.  The FBI Director, in
consultation with the Attorney General, requests that the National Security Council
Deputies Committee activate and launch the DEST for on-scene advice that can
include nuclear, biological, and chemical expertise.  The Secretary of Defense
authorizes the deployment of the DEST aircraft and all DoD personnel assigned to
the team.
Specialized assistance is available from other federal, state, or local agencies
such as the Departments of Transportation and Agriculture.26  The DEST is
incorporated directly into the existing on-site FBI crisis management structure to
advise the OSC of federal-level capabilities that can be brought to bear on the
incident.27  Besides providing interagency crisis management assistance, the DEST
can provide information management support and enhanced communications to
ensure the OSC maintains connectivity with national-level decision makers during
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the on-going crisis.  The DEST also can be organized to provide the expert advice
required for certain explosive devices and their components including chemical,
biological, nuclear, and radiological dispersal devices.  Technical expertise and
equipment is also available to operate in a contaminated environment in order to
conduct on-site activities like threat sampling, technical measurements, tactical
intelligence collection, evidence collection, and other actions.
The Military’s Role in Domestic Crisis Management
PDD 39 and assorted legislation permits DoD to develop and maintain plans and
capabilities to respond to threats or acts of terrorism, including use of nuclear,
biological, and chemical weapons.  In a domestic crisis involving WMD, DoD may
be called upon to assist in several different ways ranging from actual interdiction of
the terrorists to the loaning of specialized equipment for use by law enforcement
agencies in the crisis. The Department of Defense has published directives
establishing policy and assigning responsibility for providing military assistance to
civil authorities including specific policy for assistance to civil law enforcement
officials in emergencies involving terrorism and WMD.
DoD Policy
The Department of Defense is governed by myriad statutes and directives
pertaining to domestic use of the armed forces for any law enforcement action.  DoD
Directive 3025.15, Military Assistance to Civil Authorities, provides basic policy
guidelines for the Defense Department when supporting civilian law enforcement
agencies.  It covers “acts or threats of terrorism” and “requests for aid to civil law
enforcement authorities” taking place “within the 50 states, District of Columbia,
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, U.S. possessions and territories, or any political
subdivision thereof.”28  When DoD evaluates requests, it considers the following
criteria before providing assistance:
1) Legality - compliance with laws;
2) Lethality - potential use of lethal force by or against DoD forces;
3) Risk - safety of DoD forces; 
4) Cost - who pays and the impact on the DoD budget;
5) Appropriateness - is the mission in the interest of DoD to conduct;
6) Readiness - impact of the request on DoD’s ability to perform its
primary mission.29
The FBI recognizes four separate situations where the military may be called
upon to assist in a domestic law enforcement situation involving a threat or an act of
terrorism, including WMD terrorism: (1) providing technical support and assistance
to law enforcement and other crisis response personnel; (2) interdicting an event and
apprehending those responsible; (3) restoring law and order following an incident;
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and (4) abating the consequences of a terrorist act.30  The first two of these situations
are considered crisis response and are governed by different statutes, directives, and
approval authorities than the last two which are consequence management activities.
The Secretary of Defense is responsible for providing military assets that can
assist in both crisis response and consequence management aspects of a WMD threat
or incident upon the Attorney General’s request.  The Secretary of Defense also
designates follow-on assets capable of providing technical assistance to the FBI when
responding to the actual or threatened use of chemical, biological, or nuclear
weapons, or radiological dispersal devices.  In order to focus military contributions
to homeland defense and assistance to civilian authorities for consequence
management, DoD established a new unified, combatant command – U.S. Northern
Command – in October 2002.31
The Posse Comitatus Act
Military involvement in direct law enforcement activities is normally prohibited
by 18 U.S.C. Section 1385, unless otherwise specifically authorized under the
Constitution or Act of Congress.32  Better known as the Posse Comitatus Act, 18
U.S.C. Section 1385, prohibits the use of the military in activities such as:
Arrest; seizures of evidence; search of persons; search of a building;
investigation of a crime; interviewing witnesses; pursuit of an escaped prisoner;
search of an area for a suspect and other like activities.33
The Posse Comitatus Act, however, has not precluded the military from
providing logistical support, technical advice, facilities, training, and other forms of
assistance to civilian law enforcement agencies even though that assistance may aid
those activities.  Using a test based upon whether the military’s involvement is
“active” or “passive,” the courts have held that providing assistance as listed above
falls in the “passive” category and does not violate the Posse Comitatus Act.34
Technical support activities such as explosive ordinance disposal and  providing
specialized equipment and expert advice on WMD devices is seen in the same
manner.  Specific statutory authorities exist that cover these contingencies.
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Requests for Technical Assistance
Military technical assistance to law enforcement authorities may take many
different forms, including loaning equipment, facilities, or personnel.  The Secretary
of Defense is the final approving authority for any requests for potentially lethal
support, all support for counterterrorism operations, and certain support in situations
involving WMD.35  This includes support under 10 U.S.C. Section 382, Emergency
Situations Involving Chemical or Biological Weapons of Mass Destruction and 18
U.S.C. Section 831, Prohibited Transactions Involving Nuclear Materials.36  In
general, these two statutes allow the use of military personnel, equipment, and
technical assistance in non-hostile emergency situations (as determined jointly by the
Attorney General and the Secretary of Defense) that pose a serious threat to the
United States and its interests.  A further test of the need for assistance is if civilian
expertise and capabilities are not available or sufficient to counter the threat, the
unique capabilities of the Department of Defense are critical to defeating the threat,
and the enforcement of applicable federal law would be seriously impaired if DoD
assistance was not provided.37
Military Technical Assistance Operational Response.  In an emergency
situation, 18 U.S.C. Section 831 authorizes the Attorney General to request DoD law
enforcement assistance when nuclear materials are involved.  10 U.S.C. Section 382
authorizes assistance when chemical or biological weapons are involved.  When
providing assistance under these statutes, the military units and personnel will remain
under the military chain of command at all times.  The senior on-scene federal law
enforcement official (the FBI’s designated OSC in most cases), may request support
directly from the senior military commander at the crisis site.  The planning and
execution of all military support will remain the responsibility of the military
commander.  Any disagreements between the OSC and the military commander
regarding the request for support will be referred to the Secretary of Defense and the
Attorney General for resolution.
The commander of the military unit determines the appropriate technical
assistance procedures based on the following priorities:
1) Protect human life or prevent injuries, including injury to the military
personnel involved;
2) Prevent the use of a chemical, biological, or nuclear weapon;
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Normally, military units providing technical assistance to federal law
enforcement authorities will not be armed unless specifically requested through the
military chain of command and authorized in advance by the Secretary of Defense
and agreed to by the OSC.  Members of military units, whether armed or not, will not
be placed in hostile fire situations and are only authorized to use force in self-defense
as defined in the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Peacetime Rules of
Engagement.  The rules specify self-defense as the reasonable, necessary, and
proportional force to defend him- or herself and to defend the unit against hostile
intent and/or acts.  Deadly force is authorized against any person demonstrating
hostile intent or committing hostile acts if there is a reasonable belief that the person
poses an imminent danger of death or serious physical injury to the member or to
another person.39  When providing technical assistance to the FBI or other law
enforcement agencies, DoD expects the controlling agency to have made the  incident
area safe for assistance operations prior to admitting the military.
Notwithstanding the prohibitions of the Posse Comitatus Act,40 the military,
when providing assistance to civilian law enforcement authorities under 18 U.S.C.
Section 831 and 10 U.S.C. Section 382, may extend technical advice and assessment
to law enforcement personnel including:
1) Providing expert advice on all matters pertaining to the search, location,
identification, seizure, render safe/disarm/disable procedures, handling and /or
transport of a suspected WMD;
2) Check an area, such as a room, when trained law enforcement personnel are
unavailable and there is reason to suspect that the area contains bobby traps or
improvised explosive devices and render such devices safe by monitoring,
containing, disabling, or disposing of them or their components or elements
before  a law enforcement search of the area is conducted;
3) Undertake appropriate rendering-safe and disposal actions, including
monitoring, containing, disabling and/or disposing of or otherwise rendering safe
a suspected biological, chemical, or nuclear material or device that is not
weaponized;
4) Upon approval of the National Command Authority,41 undertake appropriate
rendering-safe and disposal actions, including the monitoring, containing,
disabling and /or disposing of or otherwise rendering safe a suspected WMD, to
include its components or elements;
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5) Participate in the questioning of suspects by law enforcement personnel, only
when necessary to determine the characteristics of the suspected WMD device,
its components or elements for the purpose of rendering it safe;
6) Provide and operate specialized equipment or vehicles;
7) Provide other assistance as requested by the Attorney General or lawfully
delegated representative and approved by the Secretary of Defense.42
Searches and Evidence.  Military personnel may search non-DoD property
during an emergency involving WMD when there is reason to suspect that the area
contains booby traps and trained FBI personnel are not available.  The FBI may ask
the military to clear the area of hazardous devices prior to a law enforcement search
of the area.  Possible criminal evidence encountered during the search may be
brought to the attention of the FBI.  The FBI and the senior military commander will
determine the procedures to use when performing the technical assistance requested
based on safety to the public, the unit, and surrounding property.  The military may
consider preservation of forensic evidence when choosing the assistance technique.
Military personnel will not compromise safety standards in order to enhance the
survival or collection of evidence for law enforcement purposes.
Disposition and Transportation of a WMD.  When a suspected or actual
WMD is rendered safe or otherwise made safe for transportation, federal law
enforcement officials are responsible for obtaining approval to dispose of the device,
including approval of the ultimate disposal site.  If the FBI specifically requests DoD
assistance through the Attorney General in the transportation and disposal of the
WMD, it must be approved by the Secretary of Defense.  The transportation of the
WMD from the incident site is not viewed as technical assistance under 10 U.S.C.
Section 382 or 18 U.S.C. Section 831.  As such, it must be authorized and funded
under a different authority.  The specific nature of the device  (chemical, biological,
radiological, or nuclear) is a critical factor when considering disposition and
transport.  Also, the evidentiary imperatives of the law enforcement process are
considered before deciding on the disposal location and method of transportation.
Reimbursement.  Military assistance provided by DoD under 10 U.S.C.
Section 382 or 18 U.S.C. Section 831 may not require reimbursement to DoD under
the provisions of 10 U.S.C. Section 377, Reimbursement.  Section 377 states that if
in DoD’s judgment, the assistance is provided in the normal course of training or
operations and the result of the support provides a benefit to the military that is
equivalent to that which the military unit would receive from normal training or
operations, no reimbursement is necessary.43  DoD evaluates each situation separately
and normally attempts to resolve reimbursement issues prior to deploying forces.
Training.  DoD requires that all personnel likely to participate in providing
assistance to federal law enforcement agencies be adequately trained and meet the
minimum operational standards set within each military unit.  Specialized units may
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train in methods for defeating WMD devices to prepare for possible employment in
domestic law enforcement situations.  The Department of Justice, in coordination
with the FBI provides the military an orientation package addressing how military
members may participate in the search and seizure of evidence or take the necessary
precautions to avoid degrading or destroying the evidence. All military personnel
likely to support law enforcement agencies are also trained in the rules of engagement
they are to follow when assisting civil law enforcement members in the performance
of their duties.  This is particularly important when the Secretary of Defense has
authorized that the military personnel be armed when performing their duties because
of the danger involved in  the mission.
Requests for Tactical Assistance
Employing a military tactical force in response to a domestic law enforcement
emergency concerning terrorism and WMD could take place in two situations - 1)
armed conflict-like situations that threaten the continuity of government and 2) a
threat endangering public safety that is beyond the tactical response capability of law
enforcement.  Most feel the more likely scenario for employment of a tactical
military force in a domestic situation will be alleviating a public safety threat that
requires capabilities exceeding the traditional law enforcement functions of arrest and
prosecution.  In either case, employment of a military force to resolve a domestic
terrorist incident, whether or not some type of WMD is involved, will mean acting
outside of statutory limitations normally imposed on the military when assisting law
enforcement agencies.
Constitutional Authority.  Only the President can authorize the employment
of active duty military in a domestic situation.  Although not expressly stated in the
Constitution, it is a generally accepted constitutional interpretation that the President
has authority under his Commander in Chief powers to direct the conduct of military
action to include the employment of a military force to repel a sudden attack against
the United States.  Among several other situations, if the President determined that
a terrorist situation threatened national survival or continuity of government or to
ensure public safety, he could order the employment of the military in a domestic
role.44
The Insurrection Statutes.  Title 10 U.S.C. Sections 331-334, known as the
Insurrection Statutes, authorize the President to seek military assistance to support
civilian law enforcement authorities when confronted with a rebellion, unlawful
obstruction, or combination of assemblage which makes enforcement of the law by
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duly constituted civilian authorities impracticable.45   If the President found it
necessary to employ the military in a domestic situation involving terrorism and
WMD, invoking the Insurrection Statutes could allow the military to operate outside
the traditional military support to law enforcement (technical assistance) and the
prohibitions of the Posse Comitatus Act.
The President may, when requested by a state legislature, or governor when the
legislature cannot be convened, send active military forces to suppress an insurrection
against state authority.46  Normally the state authorities will specify to the President
that the violence cannot be brought under control by state and local law enforcement
agencies and the state National Guard.  The President may also take unilateral action
by invoking Sections 332 and 331 of the Insurrection Statutes when he finds that
widespread unlawful activities “make it impracticable to enforce the laws of the
United States” or when the violence “hinders the execution of the laws of that State,
and of the United States within that State” or obstructs the execution of federal law.47
If the President either receives a request for assistance from a state or decides
to take unilateral action under the Insurrection Statutes, he would execute the process
in two steps following 10 U.S.C. Section 334, Proclamation to Disperse.  First, the
President would issue a proclamation commanding all persons engaged in acts of
domestic violence and disorder in the affected area to cease and desist and to leave
the area peaceably.  The President would then immediately issue an executive order
authorizing the Secretary of Defense to use active duty members of the armed forces
to suppress the violence described in the proclamation.  The Secretary would be
authorized to determine when the active military forces should be withdrawn from
the area.  The order would also require the Secretary to coordinate law enforcement
policies with the Attorney General.48
Military Tactical Assistance Operational Response.  If military force
is authorized by the President, DoD has a variety of options.  The most likely option
in the case of terrorism (especially a WMD situation) would involve tactical
assistance in the form of a Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF).  The task
force is an agile, highly trained special mission force available to the FBI if a threat
or an actual incident of domestic terrorism is considered beyond the tactical response
capability of law enforcement. In such a case, the FBI On-Scene Commander would
request that the FBI Director recommend that the Attorney General seek DoD support
for the situation.  The FBI would normally ask for military support only if its assets
are overwhelmed by multiple threats or incidents, or if the specific target, including
a suspected or known WMD, is beyond the capability of FBI tactical and technical
assets.  The JSOTF may include or have immediate access to specially trained
personnel capable of dealing with various types of WMD.  The Attorney General will
begin the process by conferring with the Secretary of Defense to determine if military
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support is appropriate using the same criteria employed in a technical assistance
situation.
The OSC will also request that the FBI Director ask the Attorney General to
deploy the emergency support team if it has not already been launched to the incident
site.  The DoD component of the DEST will include liaison officers familiar with the
capabilities of the military units most likely to be tasked to support the FBI in a
potentially hostile domestic terrorism situation.  The launching of the DEST aircraft
and all DoD personnel assigned to the team must be authorized by the Secretary of
Defense.  The military liaison officers assigned to the DEST are allowed to report
directly to DoD and contingency planning for possible military intervention may
begin. The commander of the JSOTF is integrated directly into the command group
of the FBI JOC in order to gain first-hand knowledge of the tactical situation.
Technical assistance operations may run in concert with military tactical assistance
planning. DoD may undertake precautionary steps, such as the prepositioning of a
limited number of military forces near the incident site with the approval of DoJ and
the OSC.
When the OSC anticipates that federal military assistance is necessary to resolve
the incident, he will immediately notify the FBI Director who will advise the
Attorney General of the situation.  After consultation with the Secretary of Defense,
the Attorney General will advise the President that conditions warrant the
employment of federal military forces.  If the President decides to approve the use of
military force, he invokes the Insurrection Statutes as previously discussed.  The
Attorney General, through the FBI, remains responsible for coordinating all activities
for federal, State, and local agencies assisting in the resolution of the incident and the
administration of justice in the affected area.
When presidential approval to use military force is granted, the Attorney
General will advise the FBI who will notify the OSC.  The Secretary of Defense will
advise the commander of the military task force who in turn will begin coordination
with the OSC for transfer of operational control of the incident site to the military.
Responsibility for the tactical phase of the operation is transferred to military
authority when the OSC relinquishes command and it is accepted by the military
commander.  The OSC may revoke the military authority at any time prior to the
assault phase of the operation if he determines that military intervention is no longer
required provided that the military commander agrees a withdrawal of forces can be
accomplished without endangering the safety of his personnel.
Once the incident is resolved, the military commander will return on-scene
authority and responsibility to the OSC.  The military forces will normally evacuate
the area to a mutually agreed upon relocation site to prepare for redeployment to their
home station.  However, key military personnel may be requested to remain at the
incident site if the OSC determines their presence is necessary in the investigative
process.  The FBI will provide the military members the appropriate constitutional
and procedural safeguards, including the presence of military counsel if required by
the circumstances.  The FBI will also, to the extent permitted by law, protect the
identity of the military members participating in the event and any sensitive tactics,
techniques, and procedures used by the military during the operation.
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The decision to employ active military forces against a target in the United
States, especially if it involves American citizens, remains a sensitive and
complicated issue with numerous potential political and legal ramifications.
Questions remain concerning the appropriateness of the use of federal troops and
how military force should be employed in the United States.49
Conclusion and Issues for Congress
A number of intelligence and terrorism experts argue that the trend toward
terrorists’ use of WMD is not as great a danger as other, more traditional national
security threats. But, because of the serious implications of the successful use of a
WMD by terrorists on American soil, it is most likely not an event that the American
public is willing to accept either.  To successfully combat the possibility of a terrorist
incident, especially one using WMD,  the current interagency domestic crisis
management policies and structures should be analyzed to determine their
effectiveness against the current threat and their adaptability to the future threat.
There are many critical issues concerning U.S. terrorism policy overall and
domestic terrorism specifically.  Several issues that could significantly affect the
nation’s crisis response capabilities were explored in recent national-level
commissions.  Most experts believe that a comprehensive national strategy
coherently linking national policy with the capabilities of the many agencies charged
with domestic terrorism responsibilities is a critical step in defeating the threat.
Many experts also contend that the United States would be better served by
employing the full range of DoD’s capabilities during domestic crisis response
operations.50  Some see the creation of an entirely new agency with responsibility for
“homeland defense” as the best method to ensure success against domestic
terrorism.51  Lastly, newly proposed congressional oversight roles are seen by many
as an important factor in a more effective response to domestic terrorism.
National Strategy
The current national strategy for terrorism is seen by many as an uncoupled
system of plans that individually respond to various aspects of the threat but do not
collectively ensure a comprehensive response capability in the event of a credible
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threat or actual terrorism act on American soil.  As a starting point, most observers
recommend the United States articulate an end state to which it should aim to
accomplish its combating terrorism policy.52
For example, there is no one definition of terrorism to use when coordinating
interagency combating terrorism policy.  The State Department, the Department of
Justice, and DoD, all use definitions with subtle, yet far-reaching differences.  If
terrorism is defined as merely a legal issue, then law enforcement takes priority.  In
legal terms, terrorist-related acts are now arson, murder, or kidnaping.  If terrorism
is seen as affecting national security, it is a political or military issue that could end
with response by military forces to prevent, deter, or interdict the terrorist act.
With no specific national objectives for which federal, State, and local agencies
can gauge progress or measure capability, terrorism policy, it is argued, becomes an
exercise in executing programs within a set budget.  The general policies that involve
preparation for interdicting a threatened terrorist act have no clear priority of
implementation among those responsible for executing the policy.  Comprehensive
threat and risk assessments concerning the possible use of WMD by terrorists would
allow federal authorities to make judgments as to whether funding is at the proper
level overall, as well as allocations for specific programs.  These same assessments
could assist in establishing priorities and reducing or eliminating duplication of effort
in combating terrorism programs.
Employing the Full Range of DoD Capability
Current statutory authority allows the U.S. military to act in a support role in
domestic crisis response.  Even if the President invokes the Insurrection Statutes
allowing a military response to a specific situation, federal law enforcement
personnel remain in overall charge of the operation.   It is debatable what affect the
employment of the military as a Lead Federal Agency in a domestic crisis response
role during limited terrorist attacks would have on the military’s capabilities and
probability of success.  The military appears to have sufficient capability to respond
to the narrow mission of interdicting a domestic terrorist event prior to its execution
or responding to a situation in progress when the FBI either does not have the
capability or is overwhelmed by multiple contingencies.
What appears to be the main stumbling block to better coordination and
response between the FBI and the military is the numerous and often confusing
statutory and regulatory authorities that govern the use of the military in a domestic
situation.  Different statutes apply to a situation depending on whether it is a nuclear,
chemical, or biological threat or incident.  Many experts assert that a clearly specified
legal authority in place prior to the use of federal military forces in a domestic
situation could allow for a more streamlined and effective use of these forces while
ensuring civil liberties and law enforcement concerns are respected.  Different laws
apply when employing the military in a tactical role as opposed to providing non-
hostile technical assistance.  Current laws may tend to delay or complicate military
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involvement in the situation which could reduce effectiveness.  Another issue is that
some in DoD see the use of crisis response forces in a domestic situation as not being
a legitimate mission. They express concern about the effect such use has on the
preparation of those forces to fight and win our nation’s wars.  Reduced force
structure and shrinking budgets also make it difficult to focus on taskings outside of
their primary mission.  Some express concern over widespread use of the military in
domestic situations and the effect it could have on civil rights.  They contend the
military is not trained to carry out police work, although others point out that military
forces do train in law enforcement situations and regularly exercise with federal
agencies in crisis response situations in the United States.53 
Laws that more clearly specify the military’s role in domestic crisis response
would most likely make committing resources, personnel, and effort to that role more
successful while at the same time continuing to protect the civil liberties of our
citizens.
New Federal Structures
Several recent studies and legislative initiatives proposed new governmental
structures to alleviate what they contend is the federal Government’s fragmented
approach to homeland security.  Recommendations dealing with combating terrorism
issues range from creating an independent homeland defense agency responsible for
the entire spectrum of security to reorganizing the existing structure with more focus
on current terrorism issues and threats.  These recommendations tended to
concentrate on the consequence management side of the combating terrorism issue -
how the nation should prepare to respond to the aftermath of a successful terrorist
attack.  Many of these debates were resolved when the Administration proposed and
Congress mandated the formation of the Department of Homeland Security, formed
in January 2003.54   The narrower mission of crisis response - interdicting or deterring
an attack with either law enforcement or military forces - receives much less attention
in the proposals.
Many of the suggestions for creating a new agency were grounded in the
perceived need for a unified national framework for combating terrorism.  The new
structure would be responsible for planning and integrating the activities of the
multiple government agencies involved in terrorism policy, budget considerations,
and operations.  Most importantly supporters say, the agency would coordinate the
federal response with local and state authorities to make full use of all resources
available.  While all these suggestions may make great strides towards focusing
federal, State, and local consequence management programs on the current
challenges, they do not necessarily make a contribution to crisis response issues.
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Many argue that the existing operational capabilities, processes, and procedures
that the FBI possesses as the Lead Federal Agency for domestic crisis management
are currently working well with DoD as a supporting agency.  By most accounts, the
FBI has a clear and unambiguous relationship with military crisis response forces.
Military training in domestic law enforcement scenarios is sufficient to prepare for
the employment of crisis response forces in a support role under the lead of the FBI.
Exercises designed to simulate both technical assistance and tactical support of a
domestic terrorist incident, including the use of WMD, have been successful.55  The
statutory and regulatory authorities guiding the use of the military in domestic
situations tends to complicate the administrative process of military involvement,
thereby slowing down the operational response.  But, advocates claim that the
existing processes and structures for terrorism crisis response appear to work well
overall while protecting civil liberties.
Congressional Oversight
Congress has taken a proactive approach to the significant challenges associated
with combating terrorism.  Recent legislation like the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici
Domestic Preparedness Program has been successful in enhancing domestic
consequence management capabilities at the federal, State, and local levels.
However, other attempts to legislate policy and structure for combating terrorism
have been less successful.  Proposals to create an Office of Terrorism Preparedness
and a new Deputy Attorney General for Combating Domestic Terrorism during the
last Congressional session, while initially receiving wide support, were eventually not
approved when the final version of the bill emerged.  The proposals were an attempt
to create a structure that would have budgetary and policy oversight on the dozens
of departments and agencies responsible for responding to terrorist attacks.  With
over $11 billion in the fiscal year 2001 combating terrorism budget, Congressional
oversight of increasingly complex and rapidly growing programs is a considerable
task.
Responsibility for reviewing the combating terrorism budget is now divided
among a number of key Congressional committees in both houses.  Several recent
studies have recommend a new approach to providing oversight for both combating
terrorism policy and budget.  A special joint committee or one in each chamber with
a full-time staff having the necessary experience and background in terrorism issues
that would bridge these jurisdictional boundaries has been proposed.56  Proponents
point to the permanent select committees on intelligence that each chamber now
employs for oversight of an equally complicated issue.  The objective is to help
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eliminate duplication in programs and funding and develop a more coherent national
plan for combating terrorism.
Additionally, Congress may wish to undertake a thorough review of the current
statutes and other legislation affecting domestic combating terrorism policy, with a
view toward facilitating increased cooperation among federal agencies charged with
combating terrorism responsibilities.
Conclusion
Most experts agree that the United States is vulnerable to terrorism.  While
intelligence experts contend that the use of a WMD is less likely than the more
conventional forms of terrorism, the consequences of a successful attack could be
massive.  Many believe that current U.S. policy for dealing with domestic terrorism
lacks coherent focus.  Recent proposals for restructuring national-level organizations
to deal with a major terrorist event have mostly centered on the consequence
management aspect.   Crisis response cooperation between the FBI and the military
is well demonstrated.  The military has demonstrated that it understands its
supporting role to law enforcement and is prepared to act with technical assistance
or tactical forces as called upon.  Recent changes in the NSC policy structure will
most probably take some time to have an effect on policy or operational issues.
Additionally, reshaping national strategy on domestic terrorism, more clearly
articulating the military’s statutory authority or limitations in domestic situations, and
providing critical and focused congressional oversight and assistance to those
functions would clearly enhance the capabilities of crisis response forces to deter or
interdict a possible terrorist incident.
